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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this diversity case, the plaintiffs asserted that 
Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company's refusal to pay the 
proceeds of a life insurance policy to plaintiff Dona W. Horowitz 
was a breach of contract and violated Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. C.S.A. § 201-1 et 
seq., and Pennsylvania's bad faith statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371. 
  
 We are called upon to determine whether Federal Kemper 
"attached" an application amendment to the policy within the 
meaning of section 441 of Pennsylvania's Insurance Company Law of 
1921, 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 441, and may, therefore, proceed with a 
fraud defense against the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim 
and a counterclaim for rescission based on alleged material 
misrepresentations and omissions in the policy application and 
the amendment.  We must also determine whether Federal Kemper's 
conduct was in contravention of Pennsylvania's unfair trade 
practices and bad faith statutes. 
 We find that Federal Kemper's use of a binder with 
pockets or sleeves to contain the policy, application and 
amendment satisfied the attachment requirement of section 441, 
and that Federal Kemper reasonably refused payment.  We will 
therefore vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claim and remand 
for further proceedings on this issue.  In addition, we will 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in Federal 
Kemper's favor on the plaintiffs' unfair trade practices and bad 
faith claims.  
 
 I. 
 We begin our analysis by reviewing the evidence 
presented in this case.  With one critical exception, the 
  
following material facts surrounding Federal Kemper's refusal to 
pay Dona Horowitz's claim are not in dispute.1   
 On September 26, 1991, Mrs. Horowitz and her husband, 
Dr. Leonard N. Horowitz, met with Frederick Raffetto, an 
independent insurance agent, and completed an application for a 
$1 million Federal Kemper life insurance policy, naming Dr. 
Horowitz the proposed insured and Mrs. Horowitz, the applicant, 
owner and primary beneficiary.  Both Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz signed 
Part B of the application, promising to inform Federal Kemper of 
"any change in the health or habits of the Proposed Insured that 
occurr[ed] after completing [the] application but before the 
Policy [was] delivered . . . and the first premium [was] paid." 
 On October 3, 1991, at Federal Kemper's request, Dr. 
Horowitz was examined by Carol Coady, a registered nurse.  After 
taking urine and blood samples and checking Dr. Horowitz's vital 
signs, nurse Coady asked Dr. Horowitz a series of questions 
regarding his health and medical history and recorded the answers 
                     
1
.   Our standard of review upon the grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bituminous 
Casualty Corp., 851 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1988).  On review, an 
appellate court is required to apply the same test the district 
court should have used initially.  Id.  Summary judgment is only 
appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact for 
the jury to decide.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Facts that could 
alter the outcome are "material", see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and disputes are "genuine" if 
evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that 
the position of the person with the burden of proof on the 
disputed issue is correct.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322 (1986).  Summary judgment is inappropriate when a case 
will turn on credibility determinations.  See Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. at 255. 
  
  
he gave on Part F of the policy application.  When asked whether 
he had ever received treatment for "[an] [u]lcer, colitis, 
hepatitis, pancreatitis or other disorder of the esophagus, 
stomach, intestines, liver or pancreas", Dr. Horowitz reported 
that he had been treated for lactose intolerance and a spastic 
colon in 1985 and as a result, avoided the ingestion of milk 
products and took "Metamucil" every so often.  In response to 
inquiries regarding consultations with physicians or other 
medical practitioners and the performance of electrocardiograms, 
blood studies or other medical tests within the last five years, 
Dr. Horowitz stated that he consulted with his family doctor on a 
yearly basis for a routine checkup, electrocardiogram and blood 
analysis, and identified Dr. Bradley Fenton as his personal 
physician, whom he had last visited in August, 1991.  Dr. 
Horowitz did not disclose, however, that he had seen Dr. Anthony 
J. DiMarino, Jr., a gastroenterologist, on several occasions 
beginning in 1986 and had been examined by Dr. DiMarino most 
recently in August, 1991, or that he had undergone a series of 
small bowel studies, blood tests for anemia, and tests for 
vertigo within the last five years, and two colonoscopies, one in 
1987 and another on August 8, 1991. 
 Approximately one month later, in November of 1991, Dr. 
Horowitz complained to Dr. DiMarino of pain when swallowing.  On 
December 4, 1991, Dr. Horowitz underwent a CT scan and an 
endoscopy with biopsy, and on December 5, 1991, was diagnosed as 
having terminal adenocarcinoma of the stomach.  On December 6, 
1991, Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz consulted a specialist and were told 
  
that Dr. Horowitz had approximately six months to live.  During 
the following week, Dr. Horowitz obtained three additional 
medical opinions, all confirming the original diagnosis of 
terminal adenocarcinoma.  On December 16, 1991, Dr. Horowitz had 
a catheter surgically inserted for the administration of 
chemotherapy, and on the morning of December 20, 1991, 
chemotherapy treatment was begun. 
 After learning of his condition and prognosis, Dr. 
Horowitz informed his personal attorney that he had previously 
applied to Federal Kemper for a life insurance policy and of the 
change in his health.  The attorney advised Dr. Horowitz to take 
whatever steps were necessary to secure delivery of the policy 
and reassured him that any disputes that might arise with Federal 
Kemper would be resolved in court.  
 On December 20, 1991, in the afternoon, Mr. Raffetto 
met with Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz and delivered the Federal Kemper 
life insurance policy which had been issued on December 3, 1991.  
Dr. Horowitz, in turn, paid the first premium.  During Mr. 
Raffetto's visit, Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz read and executed an 
amendment of application which provided in pertinent part: 
 The above noted application of Federal Kemper 
Life Assurance Company dated September 26, 
1991 is amended as follows: 
 
 THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN THE APPLICATION 
ARE STILL VALID AS OF THE DATE IN THIS 
AMENDMENT, AND THE PROPOSED INSURED HAS NOT 
HAD ANY ILLNESS OR INJURY, AND HAS NOT 
CONSULTED, OR RECEIVED MEDICAL ADVICE OR 
TREATMENT FROM, ANY PHYSICIAN OR OTHER 
MEDICAL PRACTITIONER SINCE THE DATE OF 
APPLICATION EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS: 
 
  
 It is agreed that this amendment is part of 
the application and of the policy issued, and 
it will be binding on any person who will 
have any interest under the policy.  This 
amendment, and the policy, will not take 
effect until signed as required below.  It is 
agreed that no coverage is in effect if any 
changes are made to the above statements in 
this form. 
 
Neither Dr. Horowitz nor his wife, however, informed Mr. Raffetto 
of Dr. Horowitz's terminal illness, the treatment he was 
undergoing or of the several medical opinions he had obtained 
since September 26, 1991 regarding his condition.   
 Although the parties agree that Mr. Raffetto unstapled 
one original amendment from the policy and presented it to Dr. 
and Mrs. Horowitz to read and sign, they dispute whether Mr. 
Raffetto actually delivered it.  Mrs. Horowitz contends that she 
never took possession of the signed amendment, and one of Dr. 
Horowitz's attorneys executed an affidavit stating that the 
Federal Kemper policy he examined following Dr. Horowitz's death 
did not include the amendment.  Mr. Raffetto, on the other hand, 
maintains that on December 20, 1991, he unstapled two original 
amendments from the policy, saw to it that Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz 
read and signed both originals, retained one original for Federal 
Kemper's files, placed the second original inside a sleeve in the 
pocket binder2 which contained the policy and application, and 
gave the binder to Dr. Horowitz.  
                     
2
.   The plaintiffs describe the pocket binder as a "plastic 
cover" with a "sleeve" or "pocket" in which papers could be 
placed.  For the sake of consistency only, we will refer to the 
item as a binder. 
  
  Dr. Horowitz spoke again to his attorney after taking 
delivery of the Federal Kemper policy and voiced concern over 
signing the amendment in light of his illness.  Counsel directed 
Dr. Horowitz to send him the policy and reiterated that 
litigation would resolve future disputes. 
 Dr. Horowitz died on May 21, 1992.  Shortly after Dr. 
Horowitz's death, Mrs. Horowitz submitted a claim to Federal 
Kemper for the proceeds of the policy.  By a letter dated 
September 25, 1992, Federal Kemper refused Mrs. Horowitz's claim, 
declaring the policy null and void due to Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz's 
failure to disclose the adenocarcinoma as, according to the 
insurer, Part B of the application and the application amendment 
required.  Federal Kemper also enclosed all premiums that had 
been paid on the policy and reserved its right to raise other 
defenses to Mrs. Horowitz's claim. 
 On December 16, 1992, Mrs. Horowitz, individually and 
as co-executrix of Dr. Horowitz's estate, and Alfred Camner, the 
estate's co-executor, filed a three count complaint in the Court 
of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, alleging that 
Federal Kemper violated Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. C.S.A. § 201-1 et seq. (Count I), 
acted in bad faith in violation of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371 (Count 
II), and breached the parties' insurance contract (Count III).  
Federal Kemper removed the case to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on January 14, 
1993.  In response to the plaintiffs' complaint, Federal Kemper 
raised fraud as a defense and also asserted a counterclaim for 
  
rescission on the ground that Dr. and Mrs. Horowitz had made 
material misrepresentations in the policy application and the 
application amendment. 
 On October 8, 1993, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  On August 30, 1994, the district court granted 
the plaintiffs' motion on Count III, the breach of contract 
claim, and entered judgment in their favor for $1 million.  The 
court concluded that even if Mr. Raffetto's version of events 
regarding delivery of the policy, application and amendment were 
true,3 Federal Kemper was barred as a matter of law from 
asserting a fraud defense based on alleged misrepresentations in 
the application and amendment because of "Mr. Raffetto's 
undisputed failure to reattach the [December 20, 1991] amendment 
to the policy at the time of delivery . . ." as required under 
section 441 of Pennsylvania's Insurance Company Law of 1921, 40 
Pa. C.S.A. § 441.  Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Assurance Co., 861 
F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1994).4  Rejecting Federal Kemper's 
                     
3
.   On summary judgment, where the non-moving party's 
evidence contradicts the movant's evidence, then the non-movant's 
evidence must be taken as true.  Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. 
Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993). 
4
.   On summary judgment, Federal Kemper's fraud defense and 
its counterclaim for rescission were limited to 
misrepresentations allegedly made in Parts B and F of the 
application and in the application amendment.  Because the court 
ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on their breach of contract claim, 
it did not reach their argument that under 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 
511(a), Federal Kemper was precluded by the results of its 
October 3, 1991 medical examination of Dr. Horowitz from 
defending on the basis of fraud; nor did it reach Federal 
Kemper's counterclaim for rescission, concluding that the 
insurer's "failure to attach the December 20 amendment to the 
  
argument that section 441 was satisfied when Mr. Raffetto placed 
a copy of the amendment inside the sleeve of a binder that also 
contained the policy and the application, the court held that the 
rule that has emerged from the two leading cases, Sandberg v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 326, 20 A.2d 230 (1941),5 and 
Frost v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 337 Pa. 537, 12 A.2d 309 
(1940), is that "if an insurance company fails to physically 
attach the application (or any amendments) to the policy at the 
time it is delivered, it is barred from asserting as a defense 
any fraudulent misrepresentations contained in the application or 
amendments".  Horowitz, 861 F. Supp. at 1258.   As to the 
plaintiffs' unfair trade practices and bad faith claims, however, 
the district court granted summary judgment in the defendant's 
favor, finding that Federal Kemper's refusal to pay Mrs. 
Horowitz's claim was neither actionable as malfeasance nor taken 
in bad faith.  Id. at 1261-62.  On August 30, 1994, Federal 
(..continued) 
policy prohibits it from asserting as a fraud defense any of the 
misrepresentations contained in the amendment, Part B of the 
application (completed on September 26, 1991), or Part F of the 
application (completed on October 3, 1991)."  Horowitz v. Federal 
Kemper Assurance Co., 861 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 
1994). 
5
.   In Sandberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 326, 
20 A.2d 230 (1941), an application was attached to an insurance 
policy, but an amendment to the application was not.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that since the amendment was not 
attached as required by section 441, both the application and the 
amendment had to be excluded from evidence.  342 Pa. at 329, 20 
A.2d at 231.  The meaning of "attach" as used in section 441 was 
not an issue in the case. 
  
Kemper filed this appeal, and the plaintiffs' cross-appeal 
followed.  The parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies.6 
 
 II. 
 For Federal Kemper to void the insurance policy on the 
basis of fraud, Pennsylvania law requires that it must show (1) 
that Dr. or Mrs. Horowitz's representations in the policy 
application and the application amendment were false, (2) that 
Dr. or Mrs. Horowitz knew their representations were false or 
made them in bad faith, and (3) that the representations were 
material to the risk insured.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. 
American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993), 
citing Shafer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 394, 
189 A.2d 234, 236 (1963). 
 Section 441 of Pennsylvania's Insurance Company Law of 
1921, however, bars an insurer from using certain documents, 
                     
6
.   When a federal district court exercises diversity 
jurisdiction, it must apply the substantive law as decided by the 
highest court of the state whose law governs the action.  Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Commercial Union, 851 
F.2d at 100.  When the state's highest court has not addressed 
the precise question presented, a federal court must predict how 
the state's highest court would resolve the issue.  Borman v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1992).  Although 
not dispositive, decisions of state intermediate appellate courts 
should be accorded significant weight in the absence of an 
indication that the highest state court would rule otherwise.  
See Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991).  
Our review of the district court's prediction and application of 
state law is plenary.  Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 
611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992). 
  
including a policy application, as evidence of fraud against an 
insured unless they are "attached and accompany[] the policy": 
 All insurance policies . . . in which the 
application of the insured, the constitution, 
by-laws or other rules of the company form 
part of the policy or contract between the 
parties thereto, or have any bearing on said 
contract, shall contain, or have attached to 
said policies, correct copies of the 
application as signed by the applicant, or 
the constitution, by-laws, or other rules 
referred to; and, unless so attached and 
accompanying the policy, no such application, 
constitution or by-laws, or other rules shall 
be received in evidence in any controversy 
between the parties to, or interested in, the 
policy, nor shall such application, 
constitution, by-laws, or other rules be 
considered a part of the policy or contract 
between such parties.  
 
40 Pa. C.S.A. § 441. 
 
 A. 
 The Pennsylvania courts have often stated that section 
441 was passed "in the interest of fair dealing" and its 
provisions should be "strictly enforced."  Syme v. Bankers Nat. 
Life Ins. Co., 393 Pa. 600, 609, 144 A.2d 845, 850 (1958); Ellis 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 228 Pa. 230, 231, 77 A. 460 
(1910).  Enacted primarily for the protection of insureds, 
section 441 establishes uniform rules for determining whether 
particular promises or statements are included within the 
contract between the insurer and the insured.  Frost, 337 Pa. at 
541, 12 A.2d at 309.  In Lenox v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 165 Pa. 
  
575, 577, 30 A. 940, 941 (1895), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
expressed what is still regarded as the aim of the statute: 
 It is well known that the evil aimed at in 
this legislation was the custom of insurance 
companies to put in their blank forms of 
application long and intricate questions or 
statements to be answered or made by the 
applicant, printed usually in very small 
type, and the relevancy or materiality not 
always apparent to the inexperienced, and 
therefore liable to become traps to catch 
even the innocent unwary.  The general intent 
was to keep these statements before the eyes 
of the insured, so that he might know his 
contract, and if it contained errors, have 
them rectified before it became too late. 
 
 Applying Pennsylvania's rules of statutory 
construction, the Pennsylvania courts have directed that the 
words and phrases of section 441 be construed according to their 
"common and approved usage" and instructed that the statute's 
letter may not be disregarded or broadened to pursue its spirit.  
Frost, 337 Pa. at 540, 12 A.2d at 310.  The courts have also 
emphasized, however, that it is essential to use reason when 
interpreting section 441 and to avoid an absurd result.  Ross v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 403 Pa. 135, 142-43, 169 A.2d 74, 78 
(1961).  Thus, in Ross v. Metropolitan Life, after considering 
the language and purpose of section 441, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court determined that the statutory requirement that a "correct" 
copy of an application be attached to a policy does not mean that 
"trivial and immaterial" errors in the copy which do not mislead 
the insured render the application inadmissible, id., and in 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Pagano, 407 Pa. 473, 474-75, 181 A.2d 319, 
  
320-21 (1962), held that section 441 was satisfied even though 
the insurer attached to the policy only one of two identical 
application sections the insured had completed. 
 The case of Frost v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 337 
Pa. 537, 12 A.2d 309 (1940), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
construed the meaning of section 441's attachment requirement, is 
singularly on point.  There, the plaintiff commenced a breach of 
contract action to recover the proceeds of a $5,000 policy issued 
by Metropolitan Life to one Emerson E. Weiser.  Attached to the 
policy upon which the plaintiff brought suit were an instrument 
referred to as an "Accidental Death Benefit" (Exhibit B) and a 
photostatic copy of Weiser's application for a previously issued 
$10,000 policy (Exhibit C).7  While the plaintiff asserted that 
Exhibits B and C were the only papers attached to the policy, 
Metropolitan Life alleged that an additional document which 
affirmed the application for the $10,000 policy and also amended 
it to make it an application for the $5,000 policy (Exhibit A) 
was "attached to the policy `by placing the same in said policy' 
and delivering the policy `with the said amendment and affirmance 
duly executed, folded therein, to the insured.'"  337 Pa. at 538, 
12 A.2d at 310.  Metropolitan Life further alleged by way of a 
defense to the plaintiff's claim that Weiser had given false 
answers in Exhibit C, the application, but conceded that unless 
                     
7
.   The court stated that Exhibits B and C were attached to 
the policy; it did not, however, describe the means of 
attachment.  Frost v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 337 Pa. 537, 
538, 12 A.2d 309, 310 (1940). 
  
Exhibit A, the additional paper, had been "attached" to the 
policy as required by section 441, it could not introduce the 
application as proof of Weiser's fraud.  Id. 
 Based on the dictionary definition of "attach":  "`to 
bind, fasten, tie or connect; to make fast or join, as to attach 
with a string'", the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found against 
Metropolitan Life, refusing to "distort" the plain meaning of 
attach or to excuse the insurer's "gross neglect" to follow the 
requirements of section 441: 
  In view of this approved definition by 
the courts and in view of the rules laid down 
by the Legislature and by the courts in 
connection with the interpretation of words 
and phrases, would it not require that the 
plain meaning of the word "attached" be 
distorted in order to find that this 
Defendant's Exhibit A had been attached to 
the policy by merely folding it and placing 
it in the policy? . . .  `We see no reason 
why this company should be exempt from the 
penalty for its gross neglect to obey the 
plain injunction of an act of assembly.'  The 
court is, therefore, of the opinion that 
Defendant's Exhibit A was not "attached" as 
provided by the Act of Assembly and to find 
otherwise, a meaning would have to be given 
to the word other than its plain definition. 
 
337 Pa. at 540-541, 12 A.2d at 311 (citation omitted). 
 The lesson we glean from Frost is that the words which 
defined "attach" and upon which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
relied to reach its decision -- bind, fasten, tie, connect or 
join -- all required the introduction of some method or mechanism 
to hold loose papers together, such that Metropolitan Life's mere 
placement of the application inside the insurance policy without 
  
more was not sufficient.  Hence, Federal Kemper's use of a binder 
to contain the policy, the application and the amendment 
distinguishes this case from Frost, where the insurer took no 
steps whatsoever to seek to insure that the various papers it 
sought to introduce against the insured would be kept together. 
 Today's meaning of "attach" is virtually identical to 
its meaning in 1940 when Frost was decided:  "make fast or join 
(as by string or glue):  bind, fasten, tie ...", Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary (1981), and likewise connotes the 
application of a mechanism that holds items in one place.  We 
thus believe that if under the definition of attach, an insurer 
may "tie" a policy, an application and amendments with a string, 
it may also "bind" or "join" these documents in a device with 
pockets (referred to as a "binder") designed to contain them 
together, and we further believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would agree.  Moreover, we do not find any support for the 
district court's conclusion that an insurer must "physically" 
attach an application and amendments to a policy in order to 
comply with comply with section 441.8  This qualifier is not 
found in the definition of attach in the Frost decision or in the 
language of the statute.  We therefore conclude that Federal 
Kemper's use of a binder is consistent with the plain meaning of 
section 441.        
 
                     
8
.   The plaintiffs assert that section 441 requires that an 
application and amendments be "physically" attached or "fastened" 
to a policy.  
  
 B. 
 As is required by Pennsylvania law, our conclusion not 
only adheres to the plain meaning of section 441, but also 
effectuates its general purpose and avoids an unreasonable or 
absurd result.  Section 441 is a prophylactic measure, enacted in 
the interest of fair dealing and designed to eliminate sharp 
practices by assuring that a policy holder has all of the 
documents that comprise the insurance contract.  This is not a 
case where the insurer attempted to take advantage of the insured 
or neglected to provide the policy holder with a mechanism to 
keep all parts of the contract between the parties before him and 
together.  Thus, were we to uphold the district court's 
construction of section 441, the statute would be turned on its 
head. 
 Based on our understanding of the language and aim of 
section 441 and our in-depth review of Pennsylvania's rules of 
statutory construction and relevant decisions, we find that the 
district court erred in applying the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
holding in Frost to the facts in this case.  We further predict 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that an 
insurer's use of a binder to contain a policy and other essential 
documents meets the mandate of 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 441.      
          We therefore hold that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their breach of 
contract claim, and will vacate the district court's order in 
this regard.  Because there exists a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the December 20 amendment was included in the 
  
binder that insurance agent Raffetto delivered to Dr. Horowitz, 
however, summary judgment in Federal Kemper's favor on either the 
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim or its counterclaim for 
rescission, assuming it met the standard of proof necessary to 
establish fraud under Pennsylvania law,9 is precluded, and this 
case must be remanded for trial. 
 
 III. 
 In their cross-appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to Federal Kemper on 
their unfair trade practices and bad faith claims, both of which 
are based on the September 25, 1992 letter Federal Kemper sent to 
notify Mrs. Horowitz of its refusal to pay the claim she had made 
for the proceeds of the life insurance policy.  The plaintiffs 
assert that the letter was unfair and deceptive because it misled 
Mrs. Horowitz into believing that she had no hope of recovering 
benefits, and was sent in bad faith because Federal Kemper did 
not have a reasonable basis for denying the claim. 
                     
9
.   As noted, because the district court granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claim, it 
did not decide whether Federal Kemper sustained its burden of 
proof on the essential elements of fraud under Pennsylvania law, 
see Evans v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 555-59, 186 
A.2d 133, 139-41 (1936)(ordinarily the issue of fraud is for the 
jury to decide, but where uncontradicted documents and/or the 
uncontradicted testimony the insured's own witnesses establish 
facts essential to the insurer's case, judgment may be entered 
for the insurer); nor did it reach the plaintiffs' argument based 
on 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 511(a).  See supra, f.n. 4.  In light of our 
disposition of the case, we do not resolve these issues.   
  
 In Pennsylvania, only malfeasance, the improper 
performance of a contractual obligation, raises a cause of action 
under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 
Pa. 73 C.S.A. § 201-1 et seq., and an insurer's mere refusal to 
pay a claim which constitutes nonfeasance, the failure to perform 
a contractual duty, is not actionable.  Gordon v. Pennsylvania 
Blue Shield, 378 Pa. Super. 256, 264, 548 A.2d 600, 604 (1988).  
See Raab v. Keystone Ins. Co., 271 Pa. Super. 185, 187-88, 412 
A.2d 638, 639 (1979).  In our view, Federal Kemper's September 
25, 1992 letter announced its decision to refuse Mrs. Horowitz's 
claim and its reasons for denying payment, and does not represent 
misfeasance.  We therefore find that the district court did not 
err in granting Federal Kemper's motion for summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs' unfair trade practices claim. 
 Finally, we agree with the district court that the 
plaintiffs' bad faith claim must fail because under the 
circumstances, Federal Kemper had a reasonable basis to deny Mrs. 
Horowitz's claim and ample grounds for its allegations of fraud.  
See D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l. Mut. Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 
510, 431 A.2d 966, 971 (1981) (in jurisdictions which recognize a 
cause of action for bad faith conduct on the part of an insurer, 
the plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for 
denying benefits or a reckless disregard of the lack of a 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on Counts I and II of the 
complaint in Federal Kemper's favor.  We will vacate the district 
court's order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs on 
Count III and remand for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' 
breach of contract claim and Federal Kemper's counterclaim for 
rescission.  
 
_________________________ 
